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Dealing with diversity: State strategies on ethnic
minority management in Southeast Asia
Matthew David D. Ordońez, Hansley A. Juliano,
and Enrico Antonio B. La Vińa
Abstract—Southeast Asia’s ethnic, political and cultural diversity
continues to pose major policy and governance hurdles in enforcing a
common community born out of the post-colonial nationalist baggage
of almost all the region’s countries. ASEAN’s “non-interference” clause
gives leeway to each member state to respond to its ethnic diversity
with nation-building projects through exclusionary governance. With
this leeway, each Southeast Asian country’s nation-building policies
legitimize a particular, existing ethno-nationalist or “ethno-religious”
majority at the expense of democratic accountability. This study
proposes a preliminary quantitative model which uses regression
analysis to compare Southeast Asian countries’ data on their religious
and ethnic populations. The initial model categorizes the types
of minority management strategies depending on their respective
ethnic heterogeneity. This study hypothesizes that a) states with more
ethnically homogenous populations will have more exclusionary and
violent state policies towards minorities, while b) states with more
heterogeneous populations will have fewer exclusionary and violent
policies. The results indicate a moderate causality between the two
variables and may be correlated with additional variables such as
the level of democratic consolidation (as tabulated by the Polity IV
democratic index) and the centralized structure of governance.

Keywords: Southeast Asia, nationalism in Southeast Asia, state-building
in Asia
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The challenge of regional diversity
Studying Southeast Asia as a region remains a constant challenge for
area scholarship, due to the region’s eclectic characteristics and a seeming
lack of commonality. However, one observable commonality among
the countries is their ethnically and culturally diverse populations. As a
post-colonial region, Southeast Asia consists of young sovereign nation-states
plunged into a fast-moving, competitive global system. Their perceived
tardiness towards modernity has pressured the nation-states to “fast
track” their consolidation of power and resources along trajectories
undertaken by non-Asian countries, particularly their colonizers.
This trajectory, while producing some economic “tigers,” is not
free from problematic elements. Hattori and Funatsu (2003: 145) have
written how “the latecomer Asian countries’ encounter with Western
modernity (through not only modern institutions but also new pieces
of knowledge, new values and blue-prints for what societies should
be like) had the effect of aggravating or mitigating the conflicts they
faced.” From this pressure to modernize, these nation-states have
made ethnicity-based policies at the expense of vulnerable minorities.
. The region’s most prominent example of ethnically motivated
state action is the still ongoing Rohingya crisis, where Burma’s Islamic
Rohingya minority have continued to be driven out of their homes by
their own country’s military since 2015 (BBC 2018a). As of October
2015, the number of Rohingya refugees has risen to 700,000—with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) being unable to curb
this ongoing crisis (Lee 2018). Though the Rohingya crisis is the most
violent case, Southeast Asia is still home to more varied, sometimes more
benign, types of state-sponsored ethnic exclusion and discrimination
(Juliano, La Viña and Ordoñez 2016). For example, in an ethnically
pluralist country, Indonesia, the Chinese minority is still denied the right
to land ownership (Yuniar 2018). These instances of ethnic conflict,
discrimination and violence persist in spite of the many international
rules and norms in place against such policies. It is even more peculiar
that the state is the main culprit in such atrocities. This complicates the
assumed predominance of liberalism even in the electoral democracies
within the region. While each country differs in its intensity in managing
ethnic minorities, they seem to follow ethno-nationalist logic as a
framework to their respective on-going nation-building processes.
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This study intends to tackle the following research questions from
the aforementioned puzzle: 1.Why do Southeast Asian countries continue
to conduct ethnicity-based policies in the context of 21st century ASEAN
?; and 2.Why do some Southeast Asian countries manage their minorities
more violently than others?
For these questions we propose a set of preliminary answers.
These initial claims are coupled with a proposed quantitative model
categorizing the types of minority management strategies a state employs
depending on its respective ethnic heterogeneity. The study operates on
the following hypotheses:
All Southeast Asian Nation-states enact policies that favor an
ethnic majority while persecuting minorities as a means of
consolidating an ethno-nationalist framework.
More ethnically homogenous populations (i.e., large ethnic
majorities) within Southeast Asia would be more predisposed
to utilize more violent and exclusionary methods for managing
minorities.
By contrast, Southeast Asian countries with more ethnically
pluralistic or heterogeneous societies (i.e., small ethnic majorities)
may be less inclined to commit violent exclusion.
The main objective of this study is to quantitatively describe the
region-wide trend of ethno-nationalist policies in managing ethnic
minorities and classify each country based on its mode of minority
management. We articulate our claim in three ways. The first section
summarizes existing literature on the ethnic dimension of nationbuilding in the region and the variety of policies involved. The second
section presents data on the correlation between a country’s ethnic
diversity and its mode of minority management. The third section
presents possible additional variables relevant to the established pattern
such as democratic consolidation, economic development, the minority
as threat discourse and the structure of government.
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The ethnic crisis of modernity in Southeast Asia
As Fukuyama (1989) declared in his now clichéd proclamation
of “the end of history,” Southeast Asia remains one of the areas of the
globe where illiberal ideologies, non-democratic ideas and nationalisms
continue to thrive in one form or another. Interestingly, during the
early years after the Cold War, Southeast Asia became a model region
in terms of development and state-modernization (Rigg 2004: 3).
The paradoxical coexistence of illiberal nationalisms and efficient
state-building is a key phenomenon to understanding the current ethnic
relations of the state. This section illustrates the consensus within the
literature on ethno-nationalism and the policies they motivate from
being tied to the emergence of “modern states” in Southeast Asia.
However, the literature also provides a wide range of ethnically
motivated policies and conflicts beyond the extremes of genocide and
violent displacement. As state capacity varies, so do the kinds of actions
that the ethno-nationalist state can enact on minorities (Brown 2003: x).
Michael Ignatieff (1995: 8) has discussed the political and ideological
conflicts between the ideas of ethnic nationalism (based on biological
ethnicity) and civic nationalism (based on performative acts of citizenship
and belonging). He specifically points to how ethnic nationalism is “a
revolt against civic nationalism itself.” This does not necessarily mean
ethnic nationalism is specifically sustained by authoritarian attitudes and
politics nor civic nationalism by democratic values. Subsequent research
by Stilz also suggests that while this conceptual distinction exists, “the
most developed accounts of civic nationalism currently on offer do not
adequately disentangle the state from the promotion of the majority
national culture in practice” (Stilz 2009: 260). This contentious relationship
between exclusivist notions of national identity and the role of the state
in sustaining them is at the heart of the phenomenon we seek to visualize.
As mentioned previously, many of the countries within the region
gained sovereignty in the late 20th century. Being a post-colonial region,
much of the modernization and state-building processes were motivated
by colonial administration and discourse (Reid 2010). Prior to colonial
intervention, the region was “state-averse” since ethnic groups remained
geographically decentralized and tribal (Reid 2010: 18). Thus, much
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of the pre-colonial and colonial ethnic and cultural divides seeped into
their state-building discourse, evolving into the nationalist agenda
observable today.
Regardless of the area, much of the literature considers modernity
and the modern state to be harbingers of classification and legibility.
James Scott (1998) articulated the role of the state as an agent of
the “administrative ordering of nature and society,” controlling both
the physical environment and human populations. Wimmer (2002)
strongly argues that ethnic and nationalistic principles are contingent
to modernity itself and are the “shadow of modernity.” For Reid (2010:
20), the starting point of Southeast Asian modernity has been “imperial
alchemy” or the colonial origins of nation-state in the region.
Politicized dimensions of ethnic identity
Ethnic identity is a complex variable in the social sciences and
leads to many methodological issues. Many have tried to distinguish
the objective markers of ethnic identity, namely the biological traits and
familial lineage, from the subjective markers, namely shared culture,
history and imagination (Anderson 2006; Chandra 2006; Malesevic
2006). Such complexity, however, may provide enough flexibility to
acknowledge the arbitrary invocation of ethnic identity by state power.
Though the idea of nationalism has evolved throughout the years, ethnic
identity remains its key ingredient.
Anderson’s (2006: 46) conception of nations as “imagined
communities” is one of the most salient ideas on the subject. It complicates
the assumption of nationalism relying on seemingly overt signs of
national identity. Rather, Anderson’s nationalism comes from shared
languages and narratives as propagated by creole intellectuals through
early forms of mass communication. When Chandra (2006) attempted
to focus on familial lineage as the objective core of ethnic identity, she
found it had little to no causality with ethnically motivated violence or
discrimination. By extension, Chandra reveals that much of the power
in the politicization of ethnic identity lies in the subjective aspects of
ethnic identity or psychologically and the emotionally charged aspects of
ethnicity. Malesevic (2006: 227) analyzes ethnic identity as an ideology that
may motivate both societal inequality and, in extreme cases, mass murder.
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Though very much intertwined, nationalism and ethnic identity
are still distinct. It is mainly political actors that conflate the two
concepts. A common distinction (Stavenhagen 1996; Wolff 2006:
31) is between ethnic-nationalism, which is based on ethnic identity
and civic nationalism, which includes immigrants and formalized
citizens into the nation regardless of biological traits or familial lineage.
The latter nationalism has been more commonly associated with
pluralistic liberal democracies. Wolff (2006: 31) further notes that
ethnic groups seek self-determination but this does not necessarily lead
to independent statehood in the way nationalism does. In his latest
work, Wimmer (2018) argues that countries have better political
integration with linguistic homogeneity, thus motivating policies
favoring a linguistic majority. However, Stavenhagen (1996: 93-94)
states the mere existence of shared attributes is not enough to trigger
conflict that requires specific actors such as “ethnic entrepreneurs” or
ethnic groups which deploy ethnic ideology.
In addition to these, the formation of ethnic identities is further
affected by another significant social force: dominant religious identities.
The tendency of many Southeast Asian countries to ethno-religious
identification has been noted in the literature. Searle (2002: 1) suggested
that this is usually “spurred by the conjunction of economic and social
marginalization with significant demographic change,” while other
research claims that this is neither as clear-cut nor deterministic as
implied (with Frith [2000] implying this is also a matter of exposure to
relative and reflexive modern conditions), so the reality of ethno-religious
identities serving as a mobilizing ideological platform should not be
ignored. It is due to these that we employ these three demographic
markers (ethnicity, religious identity and national identity) in our model
visualization below.
Methods of ethnic management
Besides the subjective and ideological motivations for ethnonationalism, there are also material conditions that necessitate the
management of ethnic diversity. There are two main motivations in
nation-state building. First is maintaining political legitimacy among
the populace (Horowitz 1993; Wimmer 1997, 2018; Brown 2003), in
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order to preserve its authority, presence and unencumbered freedom
of action. Second is the consolidation of limited economic resources
(Chua 1995, 2004; Wimmer 1997), for the purpose of accomplishing
the first motivation. The capacity of each Southeast Asian nation-state
varies as much as its ethnic demographics. As argued by Pierre Bourdieu
(1994: 15), only by maintaining unquestioned or “doxic submission to
the established order” can the nation-state maintain legitimacy and its
attendant powers. This, understandably, is more easily accomplished
with a relatively-homogenous population. Due to these realities, there
are various types of strategy that states employ to manage the ethnic
plurality of their respective populations.
Horowitz (1993: 20-21) acknowledges that ethnic identity and
its conflicts act as obstacles to even the most democratic countries
in the Southeast Asian region. Patterns in ethnic inequality produce
changes in inclusion and exclusion from political participatory practices.
Wimmer (1997; 2002) argues that ethnic identity is closely linked to
state legitimacy particularly in post-colonial states. By the end of the
Cold War, many ethnic divides emerged in many countries before civil
society took root and turned politics into “an arena of ethno-nationalist
competition” (Wimmer 2002: 113). His data found that once an ethnic faction declared independence, many other ethnic minorities also
contested independence and claimed autonomy (Wimmer 2002: 88).
In a much later work, Wimmer (2013), appropriates Charles Tilly’s
dictum of “war-making as state-making” when he observes states using
violence against ethnic masses and in favor of a dominant elite.
Despite this resonance in the literature regarding ethnic violence
not all ethno-nationalist policies lead to violence. Stavenhagen (1996:
192-202) makes among the earliest classifications of ethnic policies
across multiple regions where ethnic conflicts are present. He classifies
them into three types: assimilation, where a dominant “nationhood”
is imposed on the polity to incorporate immigrants and minorities;
exclusion, which ranges from physical violence to institutional
discrimination; and pluralism, which permits the multiplicity of ethnic
and cultural identities. Despite the frequency of assimilationist and
exclusionary policies, Stavenhagen (1996: 202) finds pluralism to be
the most common policy. Pluralist policies range from a laissez-faire
mode, which does not recognize ethnic identity, to a mode that explicitly
recognizes these differences and allows for judicious negotiations.
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Such policy schemes, despite their commonality and benefits, can have
expected mixed effects. While they may guarantee a level of concord
and possibly foster positive multicultural contact, perceived inequalities
in treatment may become touchstones of public dissent and debate.
Chua (1997) expounds on the more explicitly economic policies
and documents the cycle of privatization and nationalization of property
in Southeast Asia and Latin America. Once these regions became
independent, ethnic minorities began privatizing land and patrimonial
resources, leading the government to “re-nationalize” these resources
from them. Chua (2004: 17) attributes this trend to the spread of
liberal democracy which exacerbated inequality with the rise of market
dominant minorities. Here, state policies seem to correct these economic
inequalities on ethnic lines particularly against Chinese businesses in
Burma and Indonesia.
David Brown’s The State and Ethnic Politics and Southeast Asia (2003)
is a foundational foray into a region-wide study of ethnic politics in
Southeast-Asia. Rather than strict typologies based on variables, Brown
uses five specific case countries to highlight particular ethnic dynamics:
a. Burma exhibits an ethnocratic state where the central
government violently crushes ethnic rebellions (23-45).
b. Singapore has an ethnic corporatist regime that organizes
the concerns of different ethnic groups (47-76).
c. Thailand has an ethno-regional model which favors a core
region with economic development policies (109-142).
d. Indonesians have a neo-patrimonial regime which
normally deploys ethnic-identity during elections via
patron-client relations (77-108).
e. Finally, Malaysians exhibit class conflict between the Chinese
economic elite and the local Malays (142-179).
In summary, while much of the literature cites Southeast Asian
countries as cases on ethnic politics (Horowitz 1993; Chua 1995,
2004; Stavenhagen 1996), there are hardly any other works like David
Brown’s (2003) key work that focus on the entire region. Furthermore,
though there are clearly distinct strategies, there are not many studies
explaining under what conditions would a state favor an assimilationist,
exclusionary or pluralist strategy. Such a question may help predict
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certain actions of countries under certain conditions. There have been
many significant political changes since its publication (e.g., the Rohingya
crisis in Burma). Hence, this work seeks to further integrate the region’s
case with larger theories to either confirm or update certain assumptions
on ethnic politics in Southeast Asia.
Reading the region: An ethnic profile of Southeast Asia
This section provides a general profile of the post-colonial development
and ethnic majorities within the region. The ethnic profile identifies
the ethnic majorities and measures their proportion with the country’s
population while identifying the religious majority. From here, the coded
ethnic majority values are measured against religious majority values to
derive a variable that we call religious-ethnicity (R-E) quotient. The data
on ethnic composition was sourced from the most recent edition of the
CIA Factbook available online as of 2018. While this may not be the most
exhaustively accurate picture of the region’s ethnic composition, it is detailed
enough for the overview purposes of this study. Subsequently, we correlate
the R-E quotient with data from the Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV
Project on government regime type. These values are possible intervening
variables that may affect the type of ethnic minority management each
country employs. Finally, this section gives an overview of state actions
against minorities throughout the countries in the region.
The qualitative nature of the field and the historicizing tendency of
the literature on Southeast Asian politics can give the impression that each
country’s ethnic minority issues are primarily internal/domestic affairs. It
is easy to presume that inquiries on ethnic politics require a clear sense
of the distinct cultural and historical developments experienced by each
country. This presumption, however, belies the historical record. While each
Southeast Asian nation’s case and history may indeed be characterized as
unique, nearly all of them, with the exception of uncolonized Thailand,
had undergone decolonization by the tail-end of the Second World War.
At the same time, the vulnerabilities of newly-decolonized states (and the
state-building demands each country faced) in the context of the Cold War
(1947-1991) definitely contributed to their choices of governance (Goscha
and Ostermann 2009)—with a significant impact on their populations,
especially their minorities.
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{insert Figure 1 here}

Figure 1. Timeline of decolonization in Southeast Asia
When taking into account the treatment of ethnic minorities it
is very important to take into consideration the nature and makeup
of the majority population. In this, Southeast Asian nations still have
significant differences. However, as is shown in Table 1, there is a clearly
visible commonality.
Table 1. Religious and ethnic majority demographics of Southeast-Asian
nations (CIA 2016)
Religious
Country
Percentage
		
Majority		
Brunei
Muslim
78.8
Cambodia
Buddhist
96.9
Indonesia
Muslim
87.2
Laos
Buddhist
66.8
Malaysia
Muslim
61.3
Myanmar
Buddhist
89
Philippines
Christian
92.5
Singapore
Buddhist
33.8
Thailand
Buddhist
93.6
Timor-Leste Christian
97.6
				
Vietnam
None
80.8

Ethnic
Majority
Malay
Khmer
Javanese
Lao
Malay
Burmese
Tagalog
Chinese
Thai
Austronesian
(Tetun)
Viet

Percentage
65.7
90
40.1
54.6
50.1
68
28.1
74.2
95.9
30.6
85.7

It can be demonstrated that most Southeast Asian countries
(save for Singapore, Indonesia, Timor-Leste and the Philippines) range to
a near-1:1 correspondence between their ethnic majority and their
religious majority populations. This is codified using an R-E (religion-ethnicity)
quotient, wherein
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R-E Quotient = (R.M. Percentage)
			 (E.M. Percentage)
The relationship between such variables is illustrated below in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Religion and ethnicity correspondence in Southeast Asian
populations
Understandably, there is no demonstrable model suggesting that
membership in a dominant ethnic group guarantees membership of
a religious majority as well. However, a correspondence between the
religious and ethnic identity of a population may provide certain points
of consideration. The codification of a common ethnicity and religion
into a national narrative is still integral to the state’s capacity to governance
and maintaining social cohesion
Such factors can have considerable effects on the kind of institutional
evolution a government may take. This can be illustrated by data
from the Polity IV Project, an “annual, cross-national, time-series
and polity-case format coding democratic and autocratic ‘patterns of
authority’ and regime changes in all independent countries with total
populations greater than 500,000.” The project “captures this regime
authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from “-10 (hereditary
monarchy)” to “+10 (consolidated democracy).” The Polity scores can
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also be converted into regime categories in a three part categorization of
“autocracies” (-10 to -6), “anocracies” (-5 to +5 and three special values:
-66, -77 and -88), and “democracies” (+6 to +10).” (Center for Systemic
Peace 2018; emphasis is ours.)
The 2017 dataset of Polity IV data classifies countries in the region
into three categories. Brunei, Vietnam and Laos are deemed to be autocratic,
while Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore are classified
consistently as anocratic regimes. Finally, the Philippines, Indonesia and
Timor-Leste continue to score along the democratic spectrum. Myanmar
is an outlier after recently being classified as democratic after years of
being considered autocratic (1962-2009), and anocratic (2010-2015).
This change in classification is understandable, considering the longevity
of the military junta and the only-recent ascension of Aung San Suu Kyi’s
National League for Democracy to government in 2016 (BBC 2018b).

Figure 3. 2017 Polity IV scores for Southeast Asian countries
To test the quantitative basis for the relationship between population
demographic and form of government, we subjected the country cases’
R-E quotient and Polity IV scores to regression analysis. Below are the
results.
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Table 2 and 3. Regression Analysis Results.
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.669404135
0.448101896
0.386779884
0.727316728
11

		

Intercept

X Variable 1

Coefficients
Standard Error
t Stat
P-value
Lower 95%
Upper 95%
Lower 95.0%

1.512017867
0.219770454
6.879986999
7.23E-05
1.01486256
2.009173174
1.01486256

0.085993612
0.031811635
2.703212546
0.024265699
0.014030693
0.157956531
0.014030693

The regression analysis returned a Multiple R value of 0.669~
or around 66.9%. Furthermore, the residuals returned an x variable
coefficient of positive 0.085993612. Both these results suggest
a moderate positive correlation between a country with a visible
ethno-religious majority and that country having autocratic or
anocratic regimes. In brief, it suggests that if a Southeast Asian country’s
population is near-homogenous, there will be significant basis for a
government to primarily appeal to the majority even at the expense of
excluding their resident minorities.
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Figure 4. Regression analysis scatterplot of data.
Logically, countries with solid majorities, particularly countries with
insecure borders and emerging political cultures, have larger bases for
governments which tend to centralize power—at the expense of wider
representation and devolved powers at the local level. Nevertheless, it
would be wrong to assume that these developments are set in stone.
The historical events experienced by Southeast Asian nations
for most of the 20th century, as we will detail below, suggest such
developments have tended to be triggered by particular historical
flashpoints and crises. In the case of Southeast Asia, most of these events
occurred during the context of the Cold War and the early years of
regional decolonization. At the same time, there are also long-standing
enmities between ethnic groups which can be traced to historical,
pre-modern conflicts even prior to colonization—and some of these
conflicts have been elevated the moment one particular ethnic group
became the dominant population in a Southeast Asian country
immediately after decolonization and partition.
We managed to document, via archival analysis as well as recent local
and international news coverage, the history of minority populations
within nine Southeast Asian countries. The most relevant facts for each
country have been listed in Table 4.
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When a nation-building ideology develops towards an homogenous
narrative, it is likely to gloss over the actual ethnic composition of a
society. Anderson (2006: 110) acknowledged this when he pointed
to how “[i]n almost every case, official nationalism concealed a discrepancy
between nation and dynastic realm.” This poses significant risks to
ethnic minorities, whose perceived non-compliance to the dominant
identity renders them vulnerable to varying levels of management.
As shown in Table 4, it is the countries that a) have had long histories
of autocratic and anocratic governments with b) a significant level of
population homogeneity (Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Malaysia, Vietnam
and Cambodia) that have been known to engage in violent and
exclusionary policies against its minorities.
Table 4. Summarized data on documented actions towards minorities
in Southeast Asia1
		
Country Case

Minority

Thailand

Pattani, Yala
and Narathiwat
Muslims

Myanmar

Laos

Malaysia

Rakhine / Rohingya
Muslims

Highland/
lowland
minorities &
Hmong

Malay-Chinese

Historic Conflict
Point(s)
1909 Anglo-Siamese
Treaty

Modes of Treatment

The Pattani
Insurgency
1948 PostIndependence
Conflicts in
Arakan
The Rohingya
Crisis

Other human Rights
abuses
Dispersal/deportation

The Secret War

1964 “race riots”

Illegal execution &
torture

Abetting human
trafficking
“Mass graves” & denial
of asylum
Burning of mosques
Highlanders: forced
relocation / reeducation

Hmong: killings and
persecution
Bumiputera / NEP
policies

Singapore’s
secession
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Table 4. Summarized data on documented actions towards minorities
in Southeast Asia1
Country Case

Minority

Vietnam

Hmong, DegaMontagnards,
Khmer-Krom

Historic Conflict
Point(s)
The Vietnam War

Cambodia

Viet

The “Killing
Fields” & Ethnic
Cleansing

Indonesia

“Nonprotected”
religious
minorities

1965 Blasphemy
Law

Philippines

“Moro”

Decrees on Houses of
Worship
2008 Anti-Ahmadiyah
Decree
American-era
discrimination
Martial Law
(1972-1981) &
the Separatist
Movement
Global Terrorism
2015 Mamasapano
Clash

Singapore

2017 Marawi
Siege
1982 Mendaki

Malays, Indonesians,
“others”.
Immigrant “workers” & “CMIO” vs.
immigrants
“talents”

Source: Juliano, La Viña and Ordoñez 2016; 2017.
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Modes of Treatment
Hmong: economic /
social services neglect
Dega & Krom:
cultural & religious
persecution
Denial of citizenship

Human trafficking
Non-approval/
destruction of houses
of worship;
Blasphemy/conversion
prosecutions
Non-prevention of
minority mob killings
Mismanagement of
ARMM
Arroyo-era support of
local strongmen

Island-wide “martial law”
(2009 & 2017)
Uncertainties of the
BBL Process (under
Aquino and Duterte)

MIO’s: unequal
economic opportunities
Immigrants: unequal
“employment pass” access
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By contrast, modern-day Indonesia and the Philippines are countries with a significant disconnect between their ethnic and religious
majorities, as well as a relatively-higher level of democratization in the
region. While it does not guarantee that minorities in such countries
are protected from violent forms of discrimination, such policies tend
to be unsanctioned by their government, therefore demonstrating shortcomings in governance rather than embedded institutional prejudices
against minorities.
Singapore is another outlier as a country with an anocratic government
but one that conducts assimilationist policies vis-à-vis its minority
populations (albeit employed inconsistently). This may be explained
by Singapore’s structure as a cosmopolitan space—despite its limited
land mass for its growing population. This contradiction provides an
opportunity for partitioning policies between its “prioritized residents”
and its migrants, who are treated as potentially destabilizing elements
(Juliano, Ordoñez and La Viña, 2016: 98).
Analysis: Towards a new typology?
This section presents a typology-based ethnic profile of the countries in the region. We subsequently compare each country via the
type of ethnic policies deployed by their respective states. In testing
our hypothesis, this study uses the level of ethnic homogeneity or the
proportion of the ethnic majority to the population as the independent
variable. From there, the countries are classified in the compass from a
continuum between pluralist states or countries that permit multi-ethnic
countries, and exclusionary states or countries that perform more overt
policies of violence and discrimination against ethnic minorities. The
typology assumes that while all the countries have an ethno-nationalist
agenda, their respective state’s capacities in relation to their respective
ethnic and demographic profiles are necessarily limited to committing
outright genocide or the exclusion of multiple minority groups. Thus,
more homogenous societies may be more inclined to overt exclusion
while heterogeneous societies remain pluralist or perform less violent
exclusion.
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Figure 5. Compass of ethnic minority management based on ethnic
heterogeneity
The data shows the negative relationship between the level of ethnic
heterogeneity and the level of state violence against ethnic minorities.
The relationship between the two variables can be divided into four
quadrants. In the upper-left quadrant are countries that have both a
high level of ethnic heterogeneity and a relatively exclusionary state,
while in the lower-right quadrant are cases of states with low levels
of ethnic heterogeneity and a relatively pluralist state. The absence of
Southeast Asian countries in either quadrant supports our hypothesis
that more homogenous populations are more likely to have exclusionary
and violent state policies towards minorities, while less homogenous
populations have fewer exclusionary and violent policies.
In the upper-right quadrant are countries that have high levels
of ethnic heterogeneity and a relatively pluralist state. The lower-left
quadrant shows countries that have lower levels of ethnic heterogeneity
and a relatively exclusionary state. Thus, Southeast Asian countries
either have low heterogeneity and a force-based governance strategy
towards minorities (Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia
and Malaysia) or have high heterogeneity and less violent governance
strategy towards minorities (Singapore and the Philippines). Indonesia
is the exception in the region as it cannot be neatly categorized as a
102
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high-heterogeneity/pluralist or low-heterogeneity/exclusionary state.
Still, an examination of Indonesia’s governance of ethnic minorities
supports its classification as a pluralist state. An analysis of each country’s
regime type explains its respective minority-governance strategies.
Southeast Asia “presents a perplexing political patchwork” since
the region is home to electoral democracies, authoritarian regimes and
regimes that have both the competitive and authoritarian characteristics
of varying state capacities (Slater 2010: 7). Hence, there are regime
distinctions even within the exclusionary state and exclusionary state
categories. In the case of the exclusionary states, Thailand, Myanmar and
Malaysia are all countries with centralized authorities, while Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia are communist-led states. Communist-led states
in Southeast Asia, on the other hand, are characterized by “closed
and nominally communist political systems with open and mostly
competitive market economies” (Reilly 2013). As for pluralist states,
the Philippines and Indonesia are both considered to be personalistic
regimes, which are defined as states “where factional dynamics revolve
almost exclusively around access to patronage resources distributed
by the dominant leader” (Fionna and Tomsa 2017). According to
Winters (2011: 135), these personalistic regimes are dominated by
oligarchs whose near-monopoly of legal institutions is complemented
by the “vicissitudes that accompany personalistic rule.” Singapore, in
contrast, is characterized by Levitsky and Way (2002: 53) as an electoral
authoritarian regime due to “the uneven playing field between
government and opposition.”
An examination of Southeast Asian regime types indicates a relationship between the degree of authoritarianism and whether they can be
characterized as exclusionary states. Countries like Thailand, Malaysia,
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are more likely to employ exclusionary
management mechanisms. Myanmar, while classified as democratic by
Polity, is still dominated by the military which led the expulsion and
massacre of the Rohingya (Wong 2018). Pluralist states, on the other
hand, are relatively more democratic, as demonstrated in the cases of
the Philippines and Indonesia, which have been less intrusive in the
affairs of minorities. The exception is Singapore, which has a Polity
score lower than Malaysia and Myanmar. Singapore, in contrast to the
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Philippines and Indonesia, “developed institutions and systems that
would allow it to control, manage and harness its residents’ diversity
towards state-defined interests” (Juliano, Ordoñez, and La Viña 2016:
75). Hence, while exclusionary policies in Singapore are rarely explicit
or violent, they are nonetheless enforced with a severity and consistency
while affected groups can hardly contest them in a systemic, political
process-oriented manner.
Conclusion
This study has presented data showing a moderate correlation
between ethnic homogeneity and the types of ethnic minority management
a state employs. The region, indeed, currently experiences ethnonationalist policies, albeit with constraints. Though our model admittedly
paints many broad strokes across the countries in the region, these results
justify further elaboration on the particularities of each country and the
general type of management. There are also further opportunities to
test other intervening variables such as the level of democratization and
economic development. Democratic and authoritarian countries
necessarily have different norms regarding minorities and will definitely
complicate the model. Another variable worth testing is religion, another
ingredient of nationalism which remains relevant for certain countries
such as Thailand and Malaysia but may not be as significant in others.
This study presumes ethnic minorities to be politically-neutral elements
and would benefit from distinctions between minorities actively engaging
in forceful or violent resistance, as well as those who have chosen
non-violent engagement. Overall, despite the preliminary nature of its
findings, this study is an important initial step in understanding the logic
behind the current ethnic minority crises throughout Southeast Asia.
References

Anderson, Benedict. 2006. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2018a. “Myanmar Rohingya: What You Need to Know about the Crisis.” BBC News. 24
104

Ordońez, Juliano, and La Vińa

April. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-asia-41566561
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2018b. “Myanmar profile –
Timeline.” BBC News. September 3. Accessed October 12, 2018.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12992883
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2018c. “Brunei profile –
Timeline.” BBC News. January 9. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12990560
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2018d. “Cambodia profile –
Timeline.” BBC News. July 20. Accessed October12, 2018. https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13006828
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2018e. “Indonesia profile
– Timeline.” BBC News. October 2. Accessed October 12, 2018.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15114517
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2018f. “Laos profile – Timeline.” BBC News. July 24. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15355605
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2018g. “Malaysia profile –
Timeline.” BBC News. May 10. Accessed October 12, 2018. https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-15391762
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2018h. “Philippines profile
– Timeline.” BBC News. January 9. Accessed October 12, 2018.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15581450
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2018i. “Singapore profile –
Timeline.” BBC News. July 20. Accessed October 12, 2018. http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15971013
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2018j. “East Timor profile
– Timeline.” BBC News.February 26. Accessed October 12, 2018.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14952883
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 2018k. “Vietnam profile –
Timeline.” BBC News. September 24. Accessed October 12, 2018.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-16568035
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1994. “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure
of the Bureaucratic Field.” Sociological Theory 12(1): 1-18.
Brown, David. 2003. The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia.
London: Routledge.

105

Dealing with diversity

Center for Systemic Peace. 2018. Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets. Virginia: Center for Systemic Peace.
Accessed September 25, 2018. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/
p4ch2017.xls
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2016. The World Factbook. Central
Intelligence Agency. Accessed October 10, 2018. https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/
Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. “What is ethnic identity and does it matter?”
Annual Review Political Science, 9: 397-424.
Chua, Amy L. 1995. “The privatization-nationalization cycle: the link
between markets and ethnicity in developing countries.” Columbia
Law Review 95(2): 223-303.
Chua, Amy L. 2004. World On Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability. New York: Anchor.
Fionna, Ulla and Dirk Tomsa. 2017. “Parties and Factions in Indonesia:
The Effects of Historical Legacies and Institutional Engineering.”
ISEAS Working Papers Series, 10 March. Singapore.
Frith, Tabitha. 2000. “Ethno-Religious Identity and Urban Malays in
Malaysia.” Asian Ethnicity 1 (2): 117-129.
Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?” The National Interest
16: 3-18.
Goscha, Christopher E. and Christian F. Ostermann. 2009. Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia,
1945–1962. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press with
Stanford University Press.
Hattori, Tamio and Tsuruyo Funatsu. 2003. “The Emergence of the
Asian Middle Classes and their Characteristics.” The Developing
Economies 41(2): 140-60.
Horowitz, Donald L. 1993. “Democracy in divided societies.” Journal
of Democracy 4(4): 18-38.
Ignatieff, Michael. 1995. Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New
Nationalism. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Juliano, Hansley A., Enrico Antonio B. La Viña, and Matthew David
D. Ordoñez. 2016. “The (Re-) Emergence of State Racism on the
Eve of Regional Integration in Southeast Asia: A Survey of Five
Countries.” Budhi 20(1): 56-116.
106

Ordońez, Juliano, and La Vińa

Juliano, Hansley A., Enrico Antonio B. La Viña, and Matthew David
D. Ordoñez. 2017. “Race-Based Conflicts in Indochina: 42 Years
after the Secret War.” Paper presented at the 2017 PPSA International
Conference: “Democratic Governance in the Vortex of Change”.
Waterfront Hotel and Casino, Cebu City, Philippines. 11-12 May.
Lee, Hui Ying. 2018. “ASEAN’s Limited Role in Solving the Rohingya
Crisis.” The Diplomat, 13 October. Accessed October 13, 2018.
https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/aseans-limited-role-in-solvingthe-rohingya-crisis/.
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2002. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13(2): 51–65.
Malesevic, Sinisa. 2006. Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity
and Nationalism. Berlin: Springer.
Reid, Anthony. 2010. Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political
Identity in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reilly, Benjamin. 2013. “Southeast Asia: In the Shadow of China.”
Journal of Democracy 24(1): 156-164.
Rigg, Jonathan. 2004. Southeast Asia: The Human Landscape of Modernization and Development. London: Routledge.
Scott, James C. 1988. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. Connecticut: Yale
University Press.
Searle, Peter. 2002. “Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Rise or Decline? Recent
Developments in Southeast Asia.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24
(1): 1-11.
Slater, Dan. 2010. Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian
Leviathans in Southeast Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. 1996. Ethnic conflicts and the Nation-State.
Berlin: Springer.
Stilz, Anna. “Civic Nationalism and Language Policy.” Philosophy &
Public Affairs 37(3): 257-292.
Wimmer, Andreas. 1997. “Who owns the state? Understanding ethnic
conflict in post‐colonial societies.” Nations and Nationalism 3(4):
631-666.
Wimmer, Andreas. 2002. Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict:
Shadows of Modernity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
107

Dealing with diversity

Wimmer, Andreas.2012. Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation,
and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Wimmer, Andreas. 2018. Nation Building: Why Some Countries Come
Together while Others Fall Apart. New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.
Winters, Jeffrey. 2011. Oligarchy. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Wolff, Stefan. 2006. Ethnic Conflict: A Global perspective. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wong, Edward. 2018. “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Myanmar Military
Over Rohingya Atrocities.” New York Times, 17 August. Accessed
October 10, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/us/
politics/myanmar-sanctions-rohingya.html
Yuniar, Resty Woro. 2018. “Why Are Ethnic Chinese Still Being
Denied Land in Indonesia?” South China Morning Post, 18 May.
Accessed October 15, 2018. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/
politics/article/2136588/why-are-ethnic-chinese-still-being-deniedland-indonesia.

108

